A big part of the problem was the intelligence system itself. Many interrogators and analysts showed up at Abu Ghraib with almost no knowledge of Iraqi culture. "I learned about everything I know about Islam after I deployed," Spc. Monath said.So, instead of being an anomaly, this was another facet of the poor planning and the purposeful lack of resources given to the military in this misadventure by BushCo. Although not as deadly as sending soldiers into Iraq without the proper body armor or sufficient vehicle armor, it is, nonetheless, symptomatic of the hubris with which the whole affair was "planned."
In addition, though many of the interrogators had put in years of training in the U.S., an equal number knew practically nothing about their assignment. "We hardly got any training in interrogation before we went over," said Spc. Teaca. "It was really surprising because the job is so crucial."
[snip]
The interviews show an intelligence system ill-equipped to battle a largely faceless insurgency. Interrogators and analysts at Abu Ghraib, some of whom say they had little experience interrogating prisoners, knew little about the enemy they were fighting. And they were working within a military-intelligence system that was never designed to incarcerate and interrogate thousands of prisoners for months on end.
Problems were exacerbated by a corrosive relationship between soldiers and some of their superiors, who pressed interrogators to meet quotas on the number of interviews and reports they generated. The soldiers also faced unclear rules of interrogation that often seemed improvised on the fly.
This travesty, like the needless death of hundreds of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqis, rests squarely on the shoulders of Bush and his coterie of neo-con chicken-hawks.
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